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MISSION:INTANGIBLE, the blog of the Intangible Asset Finance Society, offers critical comments on intangible asset, corporate reputation, and finance; supplemented by quantitative reputation metrics. Intangible assets include business processes, patents, trademarks; reputations for ethics and integrity; quality, safety, sustainability, security, and resilience; and comprise 70% of the average company's value. MISSION:INTANGIBLE is a registered trademark of the Intangible Asset Finance Society.

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What Did Ya Expect?

C. HUYGENS - Friday, January 17, 2014
In the rough and tumble world of regional politics, what happens in New Jersey with its physically imposing Republican Governor and a Democratic legislature is pretty much what you would expect. Bare knuckles retribution is (or perhaps should be) as shocking as the religious practices of the Pope or the bodily functions of a bear in the woods.

As the crisis over politically-motivated lane closures on the George Washington Bridge connecting New Jersey to New York City continues to suggest that New Jersey Governor Chris Christie may have set the tone for such actions, without having directly authorized them, the bigger story is, well, the bigger story: It’s not the first time Christie has been associated with such “tough guy” tactics and, in fact, they’ve been a constructive component of his national reputation for being a no-nonsense, get the job done kind of guy. Read more.

Ironically, those most surprised by the Governor's tough-guy act appear to be conservatives who had written him off as a liberal, a RINO -- Republican in Name Only for a litany of ideologically heretical acts. Suddenly, they like what they see.

Reputation Risk Disclosure Could Boost Returns

C. HUYGENS - Monday, January 13, 2014
“The threat of a scarred corporate reputation currently ranks as the No. 1 type of strategic risk, according to a survey of board members, C-suite executives and risk managers conducted last year by Deloitte. So it’s surprising that some experts say most companies give investors fairly worthless information about reputational risks in the risk-factor sections of annual reports," writes Tony Chapelle today in Agenda, a Financial Times service.

“You have to put it into operational terms for it to mean something for the investors,” says Bill Gruver, a professor of investments and strategy at Bucknell University and former audit committee member at TheStreet. Carol Fox, the director of strategic and enterprise risk practice for the Risk and Insurance Management Society (RIMS), says that reputational risk is more about how managers cause the organization to behave to meet investors’ expectations rather than trying to cultivate an external image. “Disclosure of reputation risk in the 10-K … provides little value,” writes Jonathan Salem Baskin of the risk management consulting company Consensiv.

Yet a study by Baskin’s firm and Steel City Re, which insures companies’ reputations, is finding clues for making this disclosure more useful for investors."

Link to the Consensiv reputation risk disclosure study

Link to the full Agenda article (paywall)

Reputation: Walk the walk

C. HUYGENS - Friday, December 27, 2013
Consultants seeking to feast on reputation management pie naturally want to earn a seat at the table. Reputation management still being a field of great uncertainty and a diversity of frameworks, the price of admission often looks like a dish for a pot-luck. Alas, such a smorgasbord can be risky for those who are naive, ravenous, or gluttonous. Here's a helpful hint. Real reputation management is walking the walk, not talking the talk. Read more.

And if you have not yet prepared something to bring to the table, try this: pick up a copy of Reputation Stock Price and You: Why the markets reward some companies and punish others (Apress, 2012).

Boeing: Second-hand reputational value loss

C. HUYGENS - Sunday, December 22, 2013
Just as a rising tide floats all boats, a nation's reputation is closely woven into iconic firms that stand for national power. In the US, that puts McDonald's on similar footing as Boeing and Lockheed Martin. When a nation fails to meet the expectations of its stakeholders, the gap comprises reputational value risk. The risk of what, you might ask?

In a blog note at Consensiv, the reputation controls firm,  Managing Director Jonathan Salem Baskin explains that reputational value loss is when customers turn on you; e.g., Brazil's decision following exposure of NSA's overreach not to purchase Boeing-made military aircraft. Read more.

Hilton: Another one gets it wrong

C. HUYGENS - Tuesday, December 10, 2013
The SEC-required proxy statements, the 10-Ks, exist to level the playing field for all investors. After all, transparency is a driver of market trust and liquidity. Item 1A, Risks, was added by the Sarbanes Oxley legislation in furtherance of that noble goal, and as part of the reaction to large scale shams such as Enron and WorldCom.

Reputation risk is disclosed in many 10Ks. Just among the S&P500, the disclosure rate for reputation risk has risen from around 8% of the firms in 2009 to 66% of the firms in 2013. A study of the materiality of those disclosures reported earlier this year that the consumer sector seems to have it all wrong, confusing reputation risk with brand risk. Read the study.

(Ironically, many regulators are getting it wrong too...which eventually will have a materially negative impact on systemically important financial institutions (SIFI). Read more on getting it wrong.)

The problem with getting it wrong is not semantic. Rather, getting it wrong is fostering the belief that the path to a better reputation is to better manage social media, or any media for that matter. It focuses attention and resources in the wrong place. It is wrong because the media-associated noise is an epiphenomenon; what needs to be managed are the business processes underpinning reputation comprising ethics, innovation, safety, sustainability and security. Read more on the pillars of reputational value.

Constituent members of the consumer section continue to get it wrong. The most recent entrant into the league of wrong-thinking companies is the soon-to-be-public Hilton Hotels. Read more on Hilton.

Bali: Those negative waves

C. HUYGENS - Wednesday, December 04, 2013
Like negative waves, a negative reputation creates a perverse death spiral. This is as true for would-be war booty hunters (Kelly's heroes) as it is for capital markets and for non-governmental bodies.

Reputation is an expectation of behavior. Capital markets have a reputation for seizing when liquidity ebbs. As in musical chairs, being last to call debt has significant consequences, so at the first signs of real trouble, individual constituents of the market act on the markets reputation, call their loans, and precipitate the very thing they fear: illiquidity.

Then there's the World Trade Organization. Twelve years since the Doha round began, the institution is trying to overcome impenetrable roadblocks. No one really expects the negotiations now taking place in Bali to succeed, so no one is really motivated to yield on a sensitive point that will only create a future liability -- ensuring that the negotiations will not succeed.

Read more on the Consensiv blog.

Zurich Insurance: Properly managing an adverse event

C. HUYGENS - Friday, November 29, 2013
Reputational crises are often, but not necessarily, consequences of an adverse event. When Pierre Wauthier, Zurich’s Insurance Group’s chief financial officer, killed himself last August, and blamed clashes with the company’s chairman, Josef Ackermann, as a cause, Zurich did all the right things to protect its reputation.

Zurich understood the relationship between expectation, uncertainty and reputation; and its actions were targeted at the underpinnings of reputation. Few, especially those in the reputation management business with a PR bias, took note which is why this comment by Jonathan Salem Baskin of Consensiv is worthy of further study. Read more.

Reputation Mountains from Satisfaction Mole Hills

C. HUYGENS - Wednesday, November 27, 2013
The old joke about medical mediocrity, Jeopardy style, had the punchline "Doctor" to the set up, "What do you call the students who graduated at the bottom of their medical school class?" Humor aside, that job title, which once ensured a stable respectable income, is losing its intrinsic value as standardized patient satisfaction measures become public. A reputation for quality matters.

Alas, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, an $820 billion operating division of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, administers the HCAHPS (Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems) survey, the first national, standardized, publicly reported survey of patients' perspectives of hospital care. The HCAHPS (pronounced "H-caps") survey asks discharged patients 27 questions about their recent hospital stay. The survey contains 18 core questions about critical aspects of patients' hospital experiences (communication with nurses and doctors, the responsiveness of hospital staff, the cleanliness and quietness of the hospital environment, pain management, communication about medicines, discharge information, overall rating of hospital, and would they recommend the hospital).

The survey has teeth. Since October 2012, hospitals whose HCAHPS scores have been subpar have been penalized with reductions in their Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.

Here's the rub. There are perverse incentives in a system that seeks to optimize its operations for only one stakeholder group: patients. Without in any way diminishing the importance of customer (patient) satisfaction, a medical center's highest goal is to provide the greatest degree of affordable access to the highest quality care. Satisfaction has much to do with expectations that in matters of life and death, are often emotionally laden; quality care has much to do with optimizing health outcome in the setting of limited resources. The former is only one of several contributors to the latter, which at the end of the day, is the foundation for a medical center's reputation. There is an inherent tension, captured in the dark comedy doctor-coming-of-age novel, House of God, and rule #13: The delivery of good medical care is to do as much nothing as possible.

It does not help matters when the two concepts, patient satisfaction and institutional reputation, are intermingled. As Jonathan Salem Baskin points out in his blog at Consensiv, "Pleasing a clinic customer now will certainly have an impact what other customers expect from a future visit, but that influence isn’t necessarily direct or reliable. We presume a variety of operational variables affect reputations in the clinic industry, such as services offered, accessibility, accountability, pricing and reimbursement, even the unavailability of competing services."

Reputation mountains should not be built on patient satisfaction mole hills. It's a bad business strategy; it is also a bad health care delivery strategy.
Read more.

GM: Brand v. Reputation, Impala Edition

C. HUYGENS - Tuesday, November 12, 2013
A brand is a promise; a reputation is the promise expected, after discounting. Consider Chevy's Impala. The brand:

Impala has always been a flagship for Chevrolet. But a leader should never rest on the laurels of its past — especially when it wears the Chevy bowtie. So, when it came time to reinvent one of the brand’s most iconic nameplates, Chevy designers and engineers reached far into the future and shaped it in the present.

Are laurels of the past sufficiently solid to support such a promise? Apparently not, according to a review of the car by the Globe and Mail's Ted Laturnus. The reputation:

"I don’t trust this car. Or, more to the point, I don’t trust those that have come before it. Traditionally, the Impala has been one of the more problematic models in GM’s stable…"

Read more.

Brand reflects the owner's aspirations; reputation reflects the expectations of stakeholders; and reputational value is the economic consequence of decisions made by myriad stakeholders that impact every line item of a company's P&L. Q.E.D.

Viacom: Blockbuster busted

C. HUYGENS - Friday, November 08, 2013
It's Theodore Levitt week: a time to pause and reflect on the work of a brilliant professor of business and one of the most prolific authors at Harvard Business Review, publishing 26 articles -- a number exceeded only by Peter Drucker.

Tuesday, Levitt's most famous article, Marketing Myopia, published in the summer of 1960, was cited in an article at CFO.com that presented the November 2013 Consensiv 50 reputation league table. The star of the article is Hermes, a firm that began life as a manufacturer of buggy whips and adapted to the changing needs of its market, without losing touch why its customers sought out Hermes products. It the November league table, it was recognized for its "top of the heap" reputational value.  Read more of CFO.com

Today, in Forbes.com, another look at Marketing Myopia. The star is Blockbuster, a firm that took a decidedly different course than Hermes. Blockbuster announced this week that it will shutter its remaining 300 retail stores.

The article's premise is that Blockbuster did not get in trouble because the need for entertainment was filled by others such as Netflix and YouTube. Rather, Blockbuster failed because the need for entertainment was not filled by Blockbuster itself. Quoting from Levitt's 1960 article:

The railroads did not stop growing because the need for passenger and freight transportation declined. That grew. The railroads are in trouble today not because that need was filled by others (cars, trucks, airplanes, and even telephones) but because it was not filled by the railroads themselves. They let others take customers away from them because they assumed themselves to be in the railroad business rather than in the transportation business. The reason they defined their industry incorrectly was that they were railroad oriented instead of transportation oriented; they were product oriented instead of customer oriented.... .

While Blockbuster saw itself in the entertainment distribution business, Blockbuster’s retail customers were expecting solutions for entertainment experiences. When the expectations became harder to meet through self serve, and Blockbuster didn’t step up with operational changes to meet those expectations, Blockbuster’s reputation as a reliable solution provider for entertainment deteriorated. Management’s response to lost sales was to focus on “retail, not otherwise specified.” The strategy obviously did little to address the ongoing failure in meeting customer expectations, left employees demoralized, and precipitated a financial death spiral. Read more of Forbes.com

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